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Efforts to regionalize cardiac services can increase access costs for patients. This study is the first to 
quantify this trade off by estimating a demand model for surgery services that is used simulate the 
effect of centralization of cardiac services on hospital and treatment choices. The model is estimated 
using a sample of Medicare beneficiaries from the Cooperative Cardiovascular Project. Regulation 
policies that alter both the quality of providers and access to the providers, such as minimum volume 
thresholds, need to consider that patients will respond to changes in both dimensions. 
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A large medical literature has found that higher volume surgery hospitals have better health 
outcomes from surgery (for reviews of the literature see [1] and [2]). The volume literature has 
suggested policies based on these findings, often that hospitals offering surgery services should 
perform a minimum number of procedures per year. Groups such as the Leapfrog group, a consortium 
of insurers and providers, have recommended minimum volume thresholds (e.g., 500 coronary artery 
bypass grafts (CABGs) per year) to be met by surgery providers [3]. These recommendations are the 
result of a literature that deals almost exclusively with estimating a type of health production function 
with provider volume as an input. The volume literature does not model the decision-maker's 
optimization problem and therefore can say little about predicted behavior in the face of changing 
regulation.  
In the case of cardiac facilities, regulators face a trade off between proximity and intensity of 
use. Prompt treatment of heart attacks can improve health outcomes dramatically. The majority of 
empirical studies of hospital choice have found that distance/travel time was the primary factor in 
choice of hospital [4].  While distance is important, there is also evidence that patients are willing to 
travel a little farther in order to take advantage of facilities at higher quality hospitals [5, 6]. The 
willingness to trade distance for quality is likely a nonlinear function of health status: patients with 
extremely mild or severe attacks might not find the additional services worth the cost of travel. Thus, 
one important issue in the regulation of services is the effect it will have on access costs for patients, 
costs that might be more likely to be borne for higher quality services and costs that vary by health 
status [7]. 
This study is the first to quantify the trade off between distance and volume in estimating the 
effects of changes in the regulation of hospital services. It does this by estimating a model of demand 
that accounts for the trade offs between distance and volume at the individual level. It improves on the 
hospital choice literature by incorporating a unique data set with excellent information about health 
status. Recent studies in the volume literature have begun to address the trade off by examining the 
effects of simulated closures of low-volume providers on travel distances to remaining providers [1, 8-
10]. This model extends the volume literature by allowing individuals, in conjunction with their health 
care providers, to respond to changes in regulation policy in their hospital and treatment choices. 4
The Cooperative Cardiovascular Project (CCP) is a sample of Medicare beneficiaries that had 
heart attacks in 1994-1995. Collected from medical chart review, it provides extremely detailed 
information concerning health status at each stage of the treatment process. For example, the data 
provide information concerning the results of diagnostic tests describing the severity of the heart 
attack. The CCP data allow preferences for hospitals and treatments to vary by health status at a level 
previously unavailable to most researchers and are linked to Medicare claims data to allow for 
transfers between hospitals.  
The treatments this study will focus on are catheterization, percutaneous transluminal 
coronary angioplasty (PTCA), and CABG. Catheterization is used to visualize the blood flow in 
coronary arteries and serves as a diagnostic tool to determine the necessity of revascularization 
surgeries such as angioplasty and bypass surgery. Angioplasty uses a small balloon to open up blood 
flow in a blocked artery. Bypass surgery uses veins from other parts of the body to create an alternate 
path for blood flow around the blocked artery. In what follows, “surgery” refers to angioplasty or 
bypass surgery.  
The data are used to estimate a model of the demand for high-tech cardiac services. The 
model's key feature is that individuals take into account the effectiveness of surgery when making 
treatment decisions. Thus, individuals respond to changes in the effectiveness of treatment in all stages 
of the treatment process: admitting hospital, diagnostic procedures, and curative treatment. For 
example, lower hospital surgery volume makes surgery less effective in reducing mortality and, 
therefore, surgery services less attractive to an individual in his choice of hospital. 
The results indicate that individuals respond to both changes in distance and volume. Holding 
all else constant, a 10% decrease in the distance to the nearest surgery hospital increases the 
probability of choosing a surgery hospital by 0.9% and increases catheterization and surgery rates by 
0.2%. Reductions in volume have the opposite effect. A 10% reduction in volume, holding all else 
constant, decreases the probability of choosing a surgery hospital by 0.3% and decreases 
catheterization and surgery rates by 0.1%.  
In policy simulations where minimum volume thresholds are enforced for surgery hospitals, 
even relatively low thresholds lead to substantial decreases in the probability of a patient undergoing 5
surgery. For instance, eliminating all surgery services performing less than 50 Medicare surgeries per 
year decreases the probability of choosing a surgery hospital by 23%, decreases catheterization rates 
by 6%, and decreases surgery rates by 8%.  
Thus, there is evidence that patients respond to changes in quality in their hospital and 
treatment decisions. Regulation policies that alter both the quality of providers and access to the 
providers need to consider that patients will respond to changes in both dimensions, which directly 
impacts treatment rates and subsequently health outcomes. It is important to note that this is a partial 
equilibrium result: the demand model in this study does not capture supply-side changes in the market 
induced by alternative policies. 
The study proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the hospital choice and volume-
outcome literature with an emphasis on the contribution of the current research. Section II describes 
the data and sample used to estimate the model. Section III presents the discrete choice model and 
empirical specification. Section IV provides estimation results and shows the predicted effects of 
further regionalization of surgery services. Section V concludes. 
I. The Trade Off between Distance and Volume 
The primary focus of this study is the trade off many patients and physicians face between 
choosing a hospital that is close and choosing a hospital that is of high quality. In the treatment of 
most health events, delays in seeking care lead to worse health outcomes. For this reason, the majority 
of empirical studies have found that distance/travel was the primary factor in choice of hospital (for a 
review of this literature, see [4]). These studies included a large variety of choice characteristics that 
could alter the (indirect) utility from choosing a particular provider but often had little information 
about the individual; typically only age, gender, and race. Especially in an individual's choice of 
hospital, health status or the severity of illness could affect preferences for features of the hospitals in 
the choice set. For instance, preferences for hospitals with cardiac surgery capabilities would likely be 
highest for those individuals whose health outcomes would benefit the most from surgery. Especially 
for emergency conditions such as heart attacks, health status at admission may be more important in 
determining health outcomes than certain aspects of quality of the admitting hospital [11]. 6
Despite the urgent nature of heart attacks, there are reasons to believe that a trade off between 
distance and quality could still occur. First, ambulance protocols allow discretion in the choice of 
hospital based on the health status of the patient [12]. Furthermore, paramedics can begin basic 
treatment before arrival at the hospital, which might provide incentives to seek better quality hospitals 
when available [13]. Second, many individuals do not use emergency medical services (EMS). Studies 
have found that only 42 to 45% of heart attack patients used ambulatory services to get to the hospital 
[13, 14]. Couple this with the fact that most individuals significantly delay seeking care at all [15], and 
it is possible that once they decide to go to the hospital, they might use discretion. Third, heart attack 
has been used as the primary diagnosis before in the literature [5, 6, 16]. Evidence concerning the 
trade off between distance and service offerings is given below. 
Three previous studies included health status measures in the models of hospital choices [7, 
17, 18]. The results indicated that severity of illness was an important determinant of hospital choice: 
“Regardless of how the hospital choice equations are used, our results indicate that they are 
misspecified if relative severity and complexity of illness is not accounted for” [7, p. 609]. However, 
the health status measures they used were either aggregate measures over many diseases or 
dichotomous. 
This model extends previous work in the hospital choice literature by incorporating detailed 
information about health status. Focusing on individuals diagnosed with one particular condition, heart 
attack, allows the use of an index of severity of illness that captures the important features of health 
status known at the time of the hospital decision; that is comparable across individuals; and that takes 
on a range of values, which allows a test for a gradient effect of severity on preferences for specialized 
services. 
The primary quality measure considered in this study is hospital surgery volume. A large 
medical literature has found that larger volume was associated with better health outcomes [1, 11, 19-
21]. (Hamilton and Hamilton [22] is an exception looking at hip surgery.) There are three primary 
explanations for the observed relationship between volume and outcomes [11]. The first explanation 
posits a direct causal pathway: physicians and hospitals learn how to treat a patient or master a 
procedure by seeing more patients with the same diagnosis or repeating a procedure (i.e., learning-by-7
doing). The second explanation is reverse causation: providers with good outcomes attract more 
patients (i.e., selective referral). The third explanation is that the correlation between outcomes and 
provider volume is spurious, the result of an omitted variable bias. Thus, some other provider attribute, 
which is correlated with volume (e.g., teaching status of the hospital), directly affects patient 
outcomes. Despite caveats raised by the empirical issues above, most researchers agree that a 
relationship exists between volume and outcomes. 
Given that volume relates to better outcomes, many types of policy recommendations have 
been issued to promote regionalization (or centralization) of services. If increased volume truly causes 
better health outcomes (and perhaps lower costs), then patients (and tax payers) would benefit from 
shifting procedures from low-volume providers to high-volume providers. Even if volume is simply 
correlated with the true mechanism improving outcomes, there is still rationale for policies based on 
provider volume. Volume is an easily measurable proxy of quality in this case, especially given the 
difficulty in collecting and disseminating more direct, risk-adjusted data on quality and process 
mechanisms. Groups such as the Leapfrog group, a consortium of insurers and providers, have 
recommended minimum volume thresholds (e.g., 500 CABGs per year) to be met by surgery providers 
[3]. 
A cost to regionalization is the effects that regionalization has on access to surgery for patients 
[3, 23]. Centralization of surgery services has the potential of increasing travel times for many 
patients, especially in rural areas. This implies that proponents of regionalization should consider the 
distributional effects for patients. 
A few studies have attempted to consider such distributional effects [1, 8-10]. These studies 
simulate closure of low-volume providers and re-calculate the distances that patients would need to 
travel to reach a remaining (high-volume) surgery provider. These studies provide a starting place for 
assessing the effects of regionalization as a policy goal on patient access to services. However, these 
papers cannot make predictions about patient choice of provider and the subsequent treatment choices 
such as surgery. More studies need to be done to assess patients' willingness to travel to high-volume 
hospitals; patients might be willing to travel for major procedures [1]. This study estimates just such a 
model. 8
II. The Cooperative Cardiovascular Project 
Regulation changes that alter the number and location of cardiac services within a market will 
lead to changes in the demand for those services and hospitals offering those services, as well as 
potentially affect health outcomes. Large, regional cardiac services may provide benefits through 
higher procedure volumes, but at the cost of decreased access to care. The data used in this study are 
excellent for studying the changes in demand that result from such policy changes.  
First, the data set used in this study is a large, nation-wide sample of individuals, which 
provides power to help identify parameters associated with rare health events. The data also contain 
geographic identifiers that make it possible to trace the effects of changes in the effectiveness of 
treatment (e.g., changes in hospital surgery volumes) back to the choice of hospital; individuals face a 
trade off between travel time to a hospital and the presence and effectiveness of cardiac surgery at the 
hospital and will respond to changes in either dimension. 
Second, the data provide extremely detailed information concerning health status at each stage 
of the treatment process: existing co-morbidities at the time of the heart attack, initial severity of the 
heart attack at admission to the hospital, and the results of diagnostic tests that provide information 
about the need for curative treatment. The availability of information concerning co-morbidities at the 
time of the choice of hospital allows preferences for hospitals to vary by health status in a more 
detailed way than in previous hospital choice studies. The information about severity of the heart 
attack is unique to clinical data and not available in administrative discharge records. It provides 
important information to identify treatment choices. The data also include records of treatments 
received in the case of transfer to another hospital, allowing the researcher to observe the full set of 
treatment choices for each individual. 
The primary data for the individuals in the study come from the Cooperative Cardiovascular 
Project (CCP). The CCP was initiated by the Medicare program with the goal of improving quality of 
treatment received by Medicare patients experiencing heart attack [24, 25]. The CCP collected patient 
data through medical record review for a nationally representative random sample of Medicare 
patients.  9
The original CCP sample consisted of randomly selected patient records for patients admitted 
to non federal acute care hospitals between February 1994 to July 1995 with a primary diagnosis of 
AMI (ICD-9-CM 410, excluding a fifth digit of 2; N = 187,007). Some patients in the CCP sample 
were transferred to other hospitals. The CCP sample is merged with the respective Medicare Part A 
claims data for these and subsequent admissions. The data are merged by including in an episode of 
care all of the admissions that occurred consecutively, or within one day of each other. The claims 
data allow me to construct the remaining treatments received by individuals originally admitted to 
hospitals participating in the CCP. The claims data are also used to calculate the Medicare surgery 
volume for each hospital in the sample. 
Hospital data come from the American Hospital Association's (AHA) Annual Survey of 
Hospitals 1994 and 1995. Distances between individuals and hospitals are calculated using zip code 
data from MapInfo 5.0. Using the latitude and longitude for the centroid of each zip code, straight-line 
distances in miles are calculated using standard great circle trigonometric formulas. Phibbs and Luft 
[26] have shown that use of straight-line distance rather than road distance often does not significantly 
impact hospital choice estimates. 
The sample used in estimation meet the following criteria. First, since the CCP is a sample of 
Medicare beneficiaries, each admission should have Part A claims data available; individuals who had 
admissions without such data, or admissions to other specialized types of hospitals, are dropped (N = 
8,565).  
Second, in order to make sure that the complete episode, or sequence of admissions, for a 
particular heart attack was available, all individuals are dropped who had previous episodes in the data 
or were first admitted from somewhere other than home (N = 47,432). This sample cut is made for two 
reasons. First, patients initially transferred from another hospital have had previous and unknown care. 
Second, the distance calculations were made based on zip code of residence. For patients admitted 
from other locales these calculations would be incorrect. 
Third, individuals who chose hospitals outside of the designated choice set are dropped (N = 
45,191). The choice set is the nearest hospital in each of three service categories: no specialized 
services, catheterization only, and open-heart surgery. Each of these service categories, if chosen by an 10
individual, provides a unique set of treatment choices. At the same time, heart attack victims are not 
expected to bypass several hospitals for treatment. In addition, this definition of the choice set keeps 
the size of the decision tree manageable. The remaining sample of patients is more likely to have had 
their heart attacks close to home, minimizing the error in the distance calculations. 
Finally, patients who had unexplained sequences of procedures are dropped from the sample 
(N = 3,764). For example, these include patients with procedures at hospitals that did not have a record 
for those facilities, patients who had surgery recorded without a diagnostic procedure, patients who 
had multiple procedures recorded, and a small set of patients who transferred to hospitals that did not 
offer heart surgery. This leaves a sample of 82,055 patients for the analysis. 
Due to the size of both the sample and the choice set in the empirical model below, the model 
is estimated using a random sub-sample of one third of the patients (N = 27,083). The results from 
estimation using the other two sub-samples of one third of the patients were nearly identical to those 
reported here. 
The sub-sample used for estimation closely matches the demographic and health 
characteristics of the full sample (Table 1). The mean age in both samples is 77. Both samples are 
evenly divided between men and women, contain similar shares of minorities (9%), and are mostly 
urban (71%).  
The samples exhibit substantial variation in health status and heart attack severity. Nearly half 
of the samples have significant co-morbidities as measured by the Charlson index [27]. The Charlson 
score is a weighted sum of co-morbidities, where the weights are proportional to the risk of death from 
each co-morbidity. Higher values indicate worse health. 
Also, approximately half of the samples have evidence of at least moderate congestive heart 
failure (CHF) at presentation to the hospital (i.e., Killip class greater than I). Killip class, a measure of 
severity at admission, is used as the initial assessment of the severity of the heart attack. Using a 
method developed by Killip and Kimbal [28], heart attack patients are classified into one of three 
classes: those with no evidence of congestive heart failure (CHF) (1), those with mild to moderate 
CHF (2), and those with overt pulmonary edema and/or cardiogenic shock (3). Thus, a higher 
classification indicates a more severe heart attack. Killip class has been shown in the medical literature 11
to provide a concise representation of the severity of heart attacks [29, 30]. Finally, the vast majority 
of those patients who received information concerning systolic function by having catheterization 
show a moderate reduction; approximately 10% of individuals have severe reduction. 
Most patients chose no-service hospitals for the initial admission (38%). Treatment choices 
are combinations of a choice for procedure and transfer to another hospital. One third of the sample 
has catheterization and half of those patients go on to have surgery. Approximately 16% of patients 
are transferred during the treatment process. 
Hospital characteristics are reported for each year of the AHA survey (Table 2). No-service 
hospitals are the most common type of hospital in the sample; catheterization-only hospitals are the 
most rare type. Medicare surgery volumes typically represent one fourth to one half of the total 
number of surgeries performed at a hospital [20]. The Medicare surgery volumes in the estimation 
sample correspond to average overall hospital surgery volumes between 70 and 105 in 1994 and 
between 115 and 170 in 1995. There is large variation in the size of the hospitals in the sample as 
measured by the number of beds set up and staffed; the standard deviation is almost as large as the 
mean in the samples. Approximately 40% of the hospitals have a cardiac intensive care unit (CICU). 
The majority of hospitals have non-profit ownership status and are non-teaching hospitals.  
III. Model of Hospital and Treatment Decisions 
It is assumed that individuals and their providers have identical preferences over hospitals and 
treatments. Equivalently, the provider's role is that of a perfect agent, providing information to the 
individual, who then has the final decision concerning care. Data limitations preclude any attempt to 
account for more complex agency relationships (see [31] for a review of the agency literature in health 
economics). In what follows, “individual” refers both to the patient and to the collection of decision-
makers working on behalf of the patient.  
Consider the choices available to a heart attack victim as a sequence of treatment decisions. 
Based on information about his initial health status and his preferences for types of hospitals, some of 
which are unobserved to the econometrician, the individual then chooses a hospital. Empirically, the 
choice set includes the nearest hospital in each of three service categories: no specialized services, 
catheterization only, and open-heart surgery.  12
Afterward, the individual receives initial information about the severity of the heart attack. 
With this new information he chooses whether or not to undergo catheterization, which could include 
transfer to another hospital. Empirically, the choices include no transfer/no catheterization, no 
transfer/catheterization, transfer/no catheterization, and transfer/catheterization, respectively. The 
catheterization choice set is restricted in some cases by the choice of hospital. For example, if a no-
service hospital is chosen, then the catheterization choices are limited; no transfer/catheterization is 
not an option. 
Finally, conditional on choosing catheterization, the individual receives information about the 
systolic functioning of their heart. He then chooses a surgery option, which could include a transfer. 
The surgery options available to individuals in the third period are no transfer/no surgery, no 
transfer/surgery, transfer/no surgery, and transfer/surgery. The surgery choice set is also conditional 
on previous decisions. Specifically, surgery is only available to individuals who received 
catheterization. Table 3 shows the decision tree facing an individual having a heart attack in the 
model. Each individual chooses one of the 14 combinations of hospitals and treatments in order to 
maximize utility. 
The nature of the decision process presented above leads naturally to a nested logit (NL) 
estimation strategy. Consider characterizing the treatment regiment for a patient as choosing from the 
complete set of choices observed at the end of the process (e.g., no-service hospital, 
transfer/catheterization, and no transfer/surgery as one outcome).  In many applications the nesting of 
choices is rather ad hoc but here the sequential nature of the decision leads to natural branches in the 
decision tree (see Table 3). Thus, the NL model can be viewed as a static version of a dynamic model, 
a version in which the individual chooses the complete path of treatment simultaneously. 
For the nested logit model, consider a linearized version of the utility function for the hospital 
choice j, catheterization choice c, and surgery choice s:
(1)  scj scj cj j scj Z Y X U ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ =
Here ￿'Xj represents the utility that varies with choice of hospital. Xj includes: initial health status as 
measured by the Charlson index interacted with hospital service indicators, distance from the patient 13
to the hospital, distance interacted with a MSA dummy, and distance interacted with initial health 
status. This specification allows preferences for types of hospitals to vary by the health of the 
individual and the (dis) utility of travel costs to also differ by health status in a more detailed way than 
in previous studies.  
Xj also includes demographic characteristics interacted with hospital service indicators (i.e., 
age, gender, and race); hospital Medicare surgery volume; the number of beds; and indicators for 
whether the hospital has a CICU, ownership (for-profit, government, and non-profit omitted), and 
teaching status (major teaching hospital, minor teaching hospital, and non-teaching hospital omitted). 
In the nested logit model each level of nests must have variation in the data that belongs only to that 
nest. Since demographic and hospital information is known at the beginning of the decision process, 
these variables are assigned to the first nest of hospital choices. However, the utility derived from 
these characteristics most likely derives from their expected impact on health outcomes. 
Ycj captures the information about initial severity that is revealed at admission to a hospital and 
varies only within catheterization choice. Specifically, Ycj includes Killip class interacted with 
catheterization choice indicators. The coefficients specific to each of the catheterization choices are 
constrained to be the same across the types of hospitals. Thus, catheterization involves the same level 
of discomfort at surgery hospitals as at catheterization-only hospitals. 
Zscj includes variables specific to the surgery decision: the information on systolic function 
revealed by the catheterization interacted with surgery choice indicators. Again, the coefficients 
specific to each surgery choice are constrained to be equal across catheterization branches. Those 
patients with missing blockage status are considered the reference category in the interactions. 
Assuming the stochastic utility components, ￿scj, are i.i.d. generalized extreme value (GEV) 
gives choice probabilities  
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where Pscj is the probability of observing choice {j,c,s}. The GEV assumption allows the variance of 
the unobserved tastes components to vary across groups of choices (nests). Estimation of the NL 14
model consists of breaking the joint probability of observing each combination of choices into smaller 
conditional probabilities: 
(3)  j j c cj s scj P P P P ￿￿ = | |
Ps|cj, the probability of observing surgery choice s conditional on hospital and catheterization choices j
and c, depends only on the blockage information revealed by catheterization: 
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Thus it is possible to estimate ￿ using just this information. 
Now, to estimate ￿, define the inclusive value 
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which means the probability of catheterization conditional on hospital choice can be written 
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µc|j is the scale parameter associated with the level of surgery choices and measures the similarity of 
observed choices at that level.  
An analogous procedure is used to construct the probability of hospital type: 
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￿j is the scale parameter associated with the sets of choices at the catheterization level. In this 
framework, ￿ is identified up to a scale factor of µc|j and ￿ to a scale factor of ￿j.
The parameters are estimated jointly using full information maximum likelihood of the form 
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IV. Regionalization of Cardiac Services 
The primary trade off that this study focuses on can be seen in the coefficients on the distance 
variables and volume for choice of hospital (Table 4). An increase in the distance to a hospital lowers 
the utility from choosing that hospital and the disutility is larger in urban areas where travel time for 
any given distance is likely to be greater. This result is consistent with findings in most previous 
hospital choice studies. At the same time, hospitals with higher surgery volumes are more attractive to 
heart attack victims, holding all else constant. 
Parameter estimates of nested logit models are difficult to interpret due to the normalizations 
required and the nonlinearity of the model. The marginal effects of interacted variables in nonlinear 
models are not indicated by the estimated coefficients and can differ in sign [32]. Reductions in 
distance increase the probability that an individual will choose a surgery hospital. This means that 
fewer patients will need to transfer in order to have catheterization and surgery, which increases 
surgery rates. A 10% decrease in distance to the nearest surgery hospital, holding all else constant, 
increases the probability of an individual choosing a surgery hospital by 0.9% and increases surgery 
rates by 0.2%.  
Changes in surgery volume have the opposite effect on choice probabilities. Reductions in 
surgery volume make surgery hospitals, catheterization, and surgery less attractive. A 10% decrease in 
Medicare surgery volume at the nearest surgery hospital, holding all else constant, decreases the 
probability of choosing a surgery hospital by 0.3% and decreases the probability of surgery by 0.1%. 
The estimates for the effect of other hospital characteristics on hospital choice in the first nest 
are the most straightforward to interpret. Conditional on other features like distance, heart attack 
victims appear to prefer larger hospitals with specialized services like a CICU. They also tend to 
prefer non-profit hospitals that are typically larger and offer a larger range of services not measured 
here. It appears minor teaching hospitals are the preferred type of teaching hospital, but it should be 
emphasized that this result is conditional on other measures of the scope of the hospital such as size 
and surgery volume. 
The estimates suggest that preferences for hospital surgery services vary by health status. All 
of the demographic and health status parameters are relative to choosing a hospital with no specialized 16
services. The interactions between initial health status as measured by the Charlson index and the 
hospital service categories are all significant at the 95% confidence level. Moving from the lowest 
Charlson category to the highest category increases the probability of choosing a surgery hospital by 
7.1% on average. There do not appear to be any significant differences in preferences for hospital 
services across age and gender but minorities do have significantly different preferences for hospital 
services. 
The parameters for the catheterization choice are relative to choosing no transfer/no 
catheterization. All of the interactions of more severe Killip class with transfer and catheterization 
choices are negative and significant. The benefits to these choices are in improved health outcomes, 
which do not appear explicitly in the nested logit model. 
The results for the surgery nest are also difficult to interpret due to the nature of the 
normalization. Within each set of choice interactions the reference group is the patients with unknown 
blockage status, which consists of two groups: patients that transferred to a non-CCP hospital for 
catheterization and patients who did not have catheterization. The first group of patients could go on to 
have surgery, but the (larger) second group of patients could not have surgery. Thus, the positive 
coefficients for no transfer/surgery indicate that patients with known blockage statuses, who have had 
catheterization, are more likely to undergo surgery. The policy simulations using the nested logit 
results will allow changes in the distance to the nearest surgery hospital and the surgery volume at that 
hospital to affect decisions at all periods. 
Note that some of the inclusive values are identically one. This occurs for the catheterization 
branches that only have one choice available for surgery, namely the branches that include no 
catheterization (see Table 3). 
The policy recommendations that have resulted from the medical literature have largely 
focused around the setting of volume thresholds below which hospitals providing the surgery services 
should reconsider their provision. Grumbach et al. [8] and Birkmeyer et al. [10] were the first to 
address the trade off between distance and volume in the presence of existing thresholds. They 
simulate elimination of low-volume surgery services and re-calculate the travel times to the remaining 
high-volume surgery hospitals. Using the estimates from the model presented above, it is possible not 17
only to replicate their policy experiments, but to extend the results to predict what would happen to the 
choice of hospital and treatments. 
The following policy simulations use the estimation results to eliminate low-volume surgery 
services from the choice set and predict the optimal choices for individuals. The simulations use 
threshold levels of 50, 100, and 200 procedures per year. In 1995, 50 procedures was roughly the 60th 
percentile, 100 procedures was roughly the 80th percentile, and 200 procedures was roughly the 95th 
percentile of surgery hospitals. If Medicare patients make up one fourth to one half of total procedures, 
then this corresponds to thresholds from 100 to 800 angioplasties and bypass surgeries per year. The 
Leapfrog group recommends 500 CABGs per year. 
Table 5 shows how elimination of low-volume surgery services affects distance to the nearest 
surgery hospital. It shows the share of patients from the estimation sample that live within given 
distances of a surgery hospital. There are rather dramatic changes in distance to surgery providers 
when low-volume services are removed. When surgery services with less than 50 procedures a year 
are eliminated, the share of patients living within 5 miles of a surgery hospital falls from 36% to 22%. 
In addition, the share of patients at least 50 miles from a surgery hospital more than doubles from 7% 
to 18%. Under the policy with the highest threshold (200 procedures per year), 71% of individuals 
would have to travel over 50 miles to reach the nearest surgery hospital. 
Where previous studies of centralization end here, the model estimated in this study allows 
analysis of the effect of enforcement of volume thresholds on treatment decisions. Table 6 shows the 
results of removing the low-volume services and predicting hospital and treatment choices. The first 
two rows of Table 6 show the fit of the nested logit model. The first row shows the mean distance in 
miles to the nearest surgery hospital, the mean Medicare surgery volume, and the frequencies of 
choices in the estimation sample. The second row shows the predicted choice frequencies from the 
nested logit model. The model fits the data reasonably well. The choices of surgery hospital and 
surgery predictions are very close to the frequencies in the data. The nested logit model slightly under 
predicts catheterization rates and over predicts transfer rates. There are many branches of the decision 
tree involving transfer that have very few observations in the data (e.g., see Table 1). The logit form 18
assigns positive probability to each outcome for each person.  When summed over all the branches this 
leads to an over estimate of the probability of transfer. 
The next rows of Table 6 show the new mean distances to the nearest surgery hospital; mean 
Medicare surgery volume; and predicted choice probabilities, with percentage changes from the 
baseline prediction in parentheses, under the different volume threshold policies. When surgery 
services with less than 50 procedures per year are eliminated, the fraction of individuals choosing 
surgery hospitals falls by 23% (from 36% to 28%). Thus, in order to receive surgery, more patients 
have to transfer (29% vs. 26%). The net effect of the large decrease in admissions to surgery hospitals 
and the smaller increase in transfers is that surgery rates fall by 8% (15% vs. 16%). 
Eliminating surgery services with less than 100 procedures per year decreases the fraction of 
patients admitted initially to surgery hospitals to 19%. Consequently, transfers increase by 25%. 
Catheterization rates decrease by 13% and surgery rates decrease 18% from the baseline predictions. 
The more stringent threshold of 200 procedures per year shows the same patterns as above except the 
magnitude of the effects is much larger. This policy effectively eliminates almost all existing surgery 
services and leaves the average heart attack victim hundreds of miles from a surgery hospital. 
In general, enforcement of threshold volume levels leads to a decrease in the share of 
individuals choosing surgery hospitals initially, an increase in transfer rates, leading to a net decrease 
in surgery rates. This provides empirical evidence for the trade off between distance and volume: 
policies intended to capitalize on the benefits of increased volumes will lead to some patients no 
longer receiving catheterization and surgery. 
V. Conclusion 
State regulators face a trade off between concentrating the number of procedures performed at 
hospitals and reducing the access to cardiac services by increasing the travel time to these services. A 
large literature has shown that increased surgery volume at a hospital reduces patient mortality. Thus, 
as patients and physicians weigh the costs and benefits of surgery, regionalizing cardiac service 
hospitals may increase or decrease both surgery rates and mortality. This study models the hospital 
and treatment decisions of heart attack victims. It accounts for detailed health status of the patient and 
the ability of patients to transfer to surgery hospitals during their treatment episode. The model 19
provides predictions of the changes in hospital choices and procedure rates resulting from changes in 
the distance to the nearest surgery hospital and surgery volume at those hospitals. 
The results indicate that heart attack patients consider quality in their hospital decisions: 
increases in hospital surgery volume, which improve the benefit to surgery, increase not only surgery 
rates, but also catheterization rates and the probability of choosing a surgery hospital for treatment. At 
the same time, increases in the distance to the nearest surgery hospital have the opposite effect—they 
decrease procedure rates and the likelihood of choosing a surgery hospital. Thus, the model quantifies 
the trade off faced by regulators considering changes in the supply of cardiac services in a market. The 
results indicate that policy makers need to consider the responsiveness of patients to changes in quality 
and access when considering regulations in the hospital market. 
This study has limitations. First, up to 50% of all heart attack deaths occur before the 
individual reaches the hospital [15]. Thus, the CCP sample suffers from a form of selection; the 
patients with reported health status and hospital choices are systematically different than those heart 
attack victims not observed. In order to implement corrections for selection, some information about 
the selected sample would be necessary. This information is not available for hospital-based samples. 
If the sample of heart attack victims that were not admitted to a hospital had (ex ante) higher 
preferences for service offerings (e.g., if they died in transit to surgery hospitals), then the policy 
simulations above underestimate the costs of centralization, which would place surgery hospitals 
farther from these patients. 
Second, this study assumes a direct relationship between volume and improved health 
outcomes. The volume literature has not reached a consensus as to the magnitude of this relationship. 
The CCP is rich enough to potentially estimate the effect of hospital surgery volume on health 
outcomes and formally incorporate patients' expectations of this effect in the model. 
Finally, these results capture only the demand-side response to changes in the market for 
cardiac services. Due to substantial deviations from the competitive model in the hospital industry 
[33], the theoretical implications of increased competition are often ambiguous in this context (see 
[34] and [35] for reviews of this literature). Under cost-based reimbursement, the presence of 
insurance can lead hospitals to compete on the basis of quality, which can lead to increases in costs. 20
However, since Medicare converted to a prospective payment system, there is some evidence that 
competition lowers costs [36]. If this were indeed the case, the effects of centralization of cardiac 
services described above (decreased surgery rates and associated costs) would be partially offset by 
the decrease in competition. A full analysis of the welfare gains from centralization would have to take 
this into consideration. 
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Table 1. Individual Characteristics
Variable Freq. % Freq. %
Hospital Choice
Age (mean, sd)  76.89 7.32 76.89 7.33
Female 40,670 49.56 13,350 49.29
Minority race  7,270 8.86 2,350 8.68
MSA 58,122 70.83 19,153 70.72
Charlson index = 0 or 1  41,693 50.81 13,717 50.61
Charlson index = 2 or 3  29,070 35.43 9,622 35.53
Charlson index > 3  11,292 13.76 3,754 13.86
No-service hospital 31,236 38.07 10,363 38.26
Cath-only hospital 21,622 26.35 7,088 26.17
Surgery hospital 29,197 35.58 9,632 35.57
Cath choice
Killip I  40,264 49.07 13,244 48.83
Killip II  9,647 11.76 3,148 11.62
Killip III or IV  32,144 39.17 10,711 39.55
No transfer/no cath 53,396 65.07 17,611 65.03
No transfer/cath  17,163 20.92 5,627 20.78
Transfer/no cath  1,381 1.68 455 1.68
Transfer/cath 10,115 12.33 3,390 12.52
Surgery choice
Systolic: normal
2 3,295 19.20 1,016 18.06
Systolic: moderate reduction  12,269 71.49 4,070 72.33
Systolic: severe reduction  1,599 9.32 541 9.61
No transfer/no surgery  67,921 82.77 22,390 82.67
No transfer/surgery  11,766 14.34 3,919 14.47
Transfer/no surgery  1,006 1.23 335 1.24
Transfer/surgery 1,362 1.66 439 1.62
Sample size 82,055 27,083
1. A 33% random sample of individuals is used for estimation.
2. 17,163 individuals have information on blockage status in the full




Table 2. Hospital Characteristics
Variable Freq. % Freq. %
1994
No-service hospital 1,672 56.32 1,327 52.85
Cath-only hospital 523 17.62 487 19.39
Surgery hospital 774 26.07 697 27.76
Surgery volume (mean, sd)
1 28.52 37.90 30.12 38.89
Beds (mean, sd) 198.31 179.05 208.83 181.14
CICU 1,212 40.82 1,073 42.73
For-profit 401 13.51 343 13.66
Government 662 22.30 511 20.35
Non-profit 1,906 64.20 1,657 65.99
Major teaching
2 302 10.17 271 10.79
Minor teaching 373 12.56 330 13.14
Non-teaching 2,294 77.27 1,910 76.07
Sample size 2,969 2,511
1995
No-service hospital 2,429 61.76 2,142 59.27
Cath-only hospital 576 14.65 576 15.94
Surgery hospital 928 23.60 896 24.79
Surgery volume (mean, sd) 53.49 64.95 54.15 65.44
Beds (mean, sd) 177.88 171.06 185.56 172.58
CICU 1,501 38.16 1,437 39.76
For-profit 562 14.29 534 14.78
Government 995 25.30 846 23.41
Non-profit 2,376 60.41 2,234 61.82
Major teaching 366 9.31 354 9.80
Minor teaching 516 13.12 497 13.75
Non-teaching 3,051 77.57 2,763 76.45
Sample size 3,933 3,614
1. The surgery volume statistics are for surgery hospitals only.
2. Major teaching facilities have a resident-to-bed ratio above the
national median of hospitals with residents. The remaining hospitals




Table 3. Decision Tree
Nest 1 Nest 2 Nest 3
No-service hospital No tran/no cath No tran/no surgery
Tran/no cath No tran/no surgery
Tran/cath No tran/no surgery
No tran/surgery
Cath-only hospital No tran/no cath No tran/no surgery
No tran/cath No tran/no surgery
Tran/no surgery
Tran/surgery
Tran/no cath No tran/no surgery
Tran/cath No tran/no surgery
No tran/surgery
Surgery hospital No tran/no cath No tran/no surgery
No tran/cath No tran/no surgery
No tran/surgery27
 
Table 4. Nested Logit Estimates
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Hospital Choice
1
Volume 0.015 * 0.003
Distance -0.163 * 0.004
Dist*MSA -0.182 * 0.005
Dist*Charlson 2-3 0.007 0.005
Dist*Charlson >3 0.007 0.007
Beds 0.006 * 0.001
CICU 0.240 * 0.027
For-profit -0.487 * 0.043
Government -0.596 * 0.043
Major teaching -0.287 * 0.039
Minor teaching 0.075 * 0.033
Catheterization-only
Age 0.034 * 0.002
Female -0.035 0.050
Minority -0.238 * 0.085
Charlson 2-3 0.148 * 0.056




Minority -0.166 * 0.077
Charlson 2-3 0.188 * 0.055




Killip II -1.273 * 0.036
Killip III or IV -1.559 * 0.029
Transfer/No Catheterization
Killip II -2.251 * 0.119
Killip III or IV -2.967 * 0.074
Transfer/Catheterization
Killip II -0.714 * 0.039
Killip III or IV -0.917 * 0.03428
 
Table 4. cont.




Normal 0.806 * 0.031
Moderate reduction 0.810 * 0.027
Severe reduction 0.773 * 0.036
Transfer/No surgery
Normal -2.820 * 0.140
Moderate reduction -2.708 * 0.071
Severe reduction -2.479 * 0.177
Transfer/Surgery
Normal -2.298 * 0.110
Moderate reduction -2.456 * 0.064
Severe reduction -2.608 * 0.188
Inclusive Values
Hospital Nest
No surgery 27.086 * 2.296
Catheterization only 27.092 * 2.247
Surgery 28.838 * 2.448
Catheterization Nest
None/No Tran/No Cath 1.000 -
None/Tran/No Cath 1.000 -
None/Tran/Cath -0.543 * 0.034
Cath/No Tran/No Cath 1.000 -
Cath/No Tran/Cath -2.013 * 0.074
Cath/Tran/No Cath 1.000 -
Cath/Tran/Cath -1.491 * 0.081
Surg/No Tran/No Cath 1.000 -
Surg/No Tran/Cath 0.618 * 0.022
N 27,083
ln L -40,714.52
* indicates significance at the 95% confidence level.
1. No-service hospitals are the reference category.
2. No transfer/no catheterization is the reference
category.
3. No transfer/no surgery is the reference category.29
 
Table 5. Share of Patients Within Given Radius of Surgery Hospital (%)
Distance Observed 50 proc/yr 100 proc/yr 200 proc/yr
0 to 5 miles 36.28 22.18 13.49 3.37
6 to 25 miles 38.35 37.65 30.66 15.00
26 to 50 miles 18.20 22.06 19.88 10.78
51 to 100 miles 6.08 13.00 18.42 17.46
100+ miles 1.09 5.11 17.56 53.38
Sample size 27,083
Eliminate surgery services with <:30
 




2 Hospital Transfer Cath. Surgery
Observed
17.49 43.63 35.57 17.05 33.29 16.08
Predicted
35.83 26.11 29.86 15.89
No surgery hospitals < 50 proc/yr
36.47 101.56 27.53 29.30 28.03 14.63
(-23.16) (12.22) (-6.14) (-7.93)
No surgery hospitals < 100 proc/yr
76.79 148.45 18.63 32.64 25.96 13.05
(-48.02) (25.00) (-13.06) (-17.90)
No surgery hospitals < 200 proc/yr
216.98 257.47 6.55 36.90 23.20 10.82
(-81.71) (41.34) (-22.32) (-31.89)
1. Mean distance to nearest surgery hospital in miles.
2. Mean Medicare surgery volume at nearest surgery hospital.